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UNION SOLIDARITY, COLLECTIVE STRUGGLE AND
THE CATERPILLAR LABOR DISPUTE, 1991–1998
In “‘We Had to Stick Together’: Individual Preferences, Collective Struggle,
and the Formation of Social Consciousness” (McCall, 2008), Phil McCall uses
the United Auto Workers (UAW) dispute with Caterpillar, 1991–1998, to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the Analytical Marxist framework in explain-
ing the workers’ behavior during their nearly seven-year conflict with the
company. I agree with McCall’s analysis of Analytical Marxism and concur
with his statement that “Marxist theory (which is dynamic) argues that ex-
perience teaches workers that only through their cooperation can they fur-
ther their own interests” (McCall, 2008, 147). Sometimes, nevertheless,
cooperation in and of itself is simply not enough for attaining worker vic-
tory, as was true of the UAW’s labor dispute with Caterpillar, even though
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McCall concludes that “given the structural conditions obtaining at the time,
the final result, a holding action, can be seen as a victory” (171).
Moreover, McCall states: “Repeatedly, the workers would, at great risk
to their individual material well-being, make stands in favor of solidarity”
(149). While I believe that the UAW workers who actually participated in
the second walkout launched a heroic and militant strike against Caterpil-
lar, the strikers did not risk their individual material well-being in favor of
union solidarity to the extent claimed by McCall. Furthermore, I argue that
union solidarity was not nearly as high as McCall implies, and this ultimately
contributed greatly to the second strike’s defeat.
Furthermore, McCall unnecessarily dichotomizes the concepts of “soli-
darity” and “individual material well-being,” implicitly arguing that one must
inevitably occur at the expense of the other. Because of this, he romanti-
cizes the practice of solidarity for its own sake rather than viewing how soli-
darity can be instrumental in improving an individual worker’s material
well-being. As such, he glorifies the UAW’s two strikes against Caterpillar,
exaggerates their effectiveness, and implicitly calls for their continuation
even after, for all practical purposes, they were in trouble.
The point is not to downplay the importance of union solidarity, which
is, of course, absolutely vital to any successful labor struggle. It is important
to acknowledge, however, that union solidarity should not be celebrated
merely because of its occurrence. Rather, what must be emphasized are the
potential positive benefits that can accrue as a result of workers’ coopera-
tion. This means that when certain types of solidaristic actions fail to bring
about the desired goals, they should be abandoned and alternative forms
of union solidarity should be implemented, if at all possible.
The purpose of this note, then, is to demonstrate how McCall misin-
terprets key aspects of the Caterpillar labor dispute while concomitantly
overestimating the level of union solidarity present during the second strike;
additionally, he overstates the ultimate success achieved by the union dur-
ing its seven-year dispute with the company. I will argue that, instead of
conducting a second authorized strike during 1994–5, the workers could have
potentially used an alternative form of worker solidarity that might have been
more effective, reducing their risk to harming their individual material well-
being. Union solidarity and maximizing individual well-being, therefore,
need not be mutually exclusive pursuits.
The 1991–2 Strike and How It Ended
McCall (2008, 163) discusses how after negotiations concluded between
the UAW and Caterpillar on November 3, 1991, the UAW leadership called
a strike at only two Illinois plants, containing 2,400 workers, as opposed to
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striking all the plants which would have brought out all 13,000 workers
employed at the company. As McCall accurately recounts, five months into
the work stoppage, the company sent letters to the strikers instructing them
to return to work on April 6, 1992 (one week later) or to risk being perma-
nently replaced. Furthermore, McCall concludes that the workers were con-
fident that they could “resist such a move through solidarity. In other words,
defections in the face of such threats can be averted through coalitional
practice.” In defense of his position, McCall cites one of the strikers, Rich
Giddens, who told him that it was possible that the company would replace
strikers that did not return but that such an outcome was improbable.
Thus, when the UAW leadership ended the walkout on April 14 with
the strikers returning to work “unconditionally” and the company imple-
menting its final offer, McCall refers to it as “a surprise move” (164). If one
understands the context, however, this is hardly the case. What McCall ex-
cludes in his reporting of the conflict is that on the first day upon Caterpillar’s
announcement that it was seeking permanent replacement workers, the
corporation received telephone calls from approximately 40,000 people
throughout the United States asking about jobs. Not long thereafter, Cater-
pillar received employment applications from thousands of individuals and
was already vetting them for permanent employment.
Additionally, this deal was brokered by a federal mediator. In exchange
for the UAW terminating its walkout, Caterpillar agreed to stop screening
applicants and to resome negotiations (Cimini, 1998, 6; Franklin, 2001, 103–
4). Although it is impossible to know with absolute certainty, if the strike
had continued, I believe Caterpillar would have hired these permanent
replacement workers and unless the strikers could have prevented them from
crossing the picket line, the situation that occurred during the Hormel Strike
in Austin (Minnesota) during 1985–1986 (Rachleff, 1993; Green, 1990)
would have been repeated at Caterpillar.
The UAW’s Second Strike Against Caterpillar
After discussing the wave of wildcat strikes that the workers launched
against Caterpillar during 1993 and 1994, McCall (166–7) relates how, on
June 20, 1994, after recommencing contract talks “for the first time in two
years,” the two sides met for only 40 minutes before negotiations broke down.
In response, the UAW called for the second strike to begin on June 21. How-
ever, the Mapleton and Pontiac plants’ workers struck on June 20, with 6,000
additional workers walking out the following day.
Unfortunately, after relating these facts (167), McCall does not tell us
anything that occurred during this 17-month strike. In the article’s next
paragraph, he reports that after a number of “discreet” meetings between
the UAW and Caterpillar, the company presented the union with a contract
proposal on November 28, 1995. At the December 2–3 membership meet-
ings, the UAW leaders submitted the company’s offer to the workers, inform-
ing them that “the union would unconditionally end the strike and cut off
strike pay” no matter how the workers voted on the proposal. Considering
the harshness of the offer, McCall concludes that most of the strikers “were
prepared to continue the strike indefinitely,” and states: “Unsurprisingly to
anyone (outside of the company and the union leadership), the workers
rejected the agreement by an overall margin of more than 80% (90% at some
locals) the same weekend” (168).
McCall’s implication is that the UAW leadership sold out the strike by
ending it prematurely and that it could have been successful if it had been
allowed to continue. But what McCall fails to tell us is that the strike was
already in severe trouble and most probably had already been lost. While it
is impossible to determine definitively whether the strike’s continuation
would have helped the union, it is highly unlikely. According to Cohen (2002,
84), Caterpillar remained highly profitable during the strike by staffing its
assembly lines with “5,000 reassigned white collar employees, 3,700 full-time
and part-time new hires, and 4,000 union members who crossed the picket
line.” For a union to conduct a successful strike, it must be able to have a
negative impact on the company’s profitability. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that prolonging the walkout would have enabled the UAW to do
this.
Besides omitting the fact that Caterpillar operated profitably through-
out the strike, McCall fails to mention that the 4,000 strikers who crossed
the picket lines represented 30% of the UAW’s membership at the com-
pany. The shop floor expertise of the 4,000 UAW strikebreakers was a key
reason why Caterpillar remained profitable during the walkout. Thus, union
solidarity was not nearly as high as McCall implies in his article. Certainly,
obtaining 70% of the vote in an election would demonstrate enormous sup-
port for a candidate; in a strike, however, such a percentage is far less im-
pressive. And the UAW International realized this. When the union
discovered that 25% of union members went back to work during the
walkout’s first week, the UAW International doubled strike benefits from
$150 to $300 per week in order to encourage union solidarity and to dis-
courage further defections. The union felt that additional strikers crossing
the picket line would seriously harm the work stoppage (Bologna, 1998, 2).
Within two weeks of the second strike’s commencement, however, approxi-
mately 30% of UAW members were working. Thus, if the UAW were to
implement a successful strike against the company, this would require a
much higher level of union solidarity than having nearly one-third of its
workers cross the picket line.
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Other labor commentators feel that the lack of solidarity among the UAW
membership was a major cause of the union’s defeat in the 1994–1995 strike.
Jones and Grey (1995) contend that the 4,000 union members who became
picket-line crossers could have been dissuaded from taking this action if mass
picketing had been implemented in an attempt to shut down the plants.
Furthermore, the outcome of the UAW members’ contract ratification
vote at the December 1995 meeting does not provide support for McCall’s
major contention that the workers risked “their individual material well-being.
. . . in favor of solidarity” and that they “were prepared to continue the strike
indefinitely” (149, 168). Because the UAW International told the members before
the vote that the strike would be terminated regardless of the vote’s outcome
and because this proposal was the same as Caterpillar’s offer prior to the sec-
ond strike’s initiation (Bologna, 1995, 2; Cimini, 1998, 9), the workers had no
incentive for approving the proposed contract. Since they were returning to
work under the same conditions regardless of the vote’s result, it makes sense
that more than 80% of the workers voted to reject the proposal. By voting it
down, there was at least some probability that any future contract offers would
be superior to the 1995 proposed accord. A true indication of the strikers’
militancy would have been if they rejected the 1995 contract without the UAW
International assuring their return to work. Would the vote’s outcome have
been comparable under such conditions? Possibly, but I am dubious.
Obtaining a Contract in March 1998
McCall implies that the “momentum in the dispute shifted perceptibly
in 1997” (169) towards the union, eventually culminating in the workers
ratifying a contract in March 1998, because of a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) decision that the 1994–5 strike was due to (and subsequently
extended by) the company committing a series of unfair labor practices.
McCall maintains that this is important because if the NLRB deems that a
strike results from a company committing unfair labor practices, the strik-
ers cannot be permanently replaced. While McCall is technically correct,
this fact is irrelevant because when this decision came down in January 1997,
the workers were no longer on strike and none of them had been perma-
nently replaced or were being threatened with permanent replacement!
McCall outlines the tentative contract provisions brought to the mem-
bership in February 1998 and the major reasons for its rejection (the require-
ment that 50 fired strikers’ cases be arbitrated). He, nevertheless, incorrectly
asserts that by continuing their strike they were demonstrating solidarity with
the terminated workers (McCall, 2008, 170–2). At the time of this contract
rejection, the workers were no longer striking; they had been working for
more than two years (albeit without a contract).
Finally, McCall’s statement that even “given the structural conditions
obtaining at the time, the final result, a holding action, can be seen as a vic-
tory” (171), is, I would argue, at best an exaggeration and at the worst com-
pletely untrue. While describing the contract terms approved in March 1998,
which guaranteed that the 50 fired workers would be allowed to return to work,
undoubtedly an improvement from the February 1998 tentative accord, McCall
fails to reveal the most sinister parts of the contract — specifically, that Cater-
pillar was allowed to determine union practices that should be, based on basic
union principles, strictly internal union affairs. The ratified accord contained
provisions “that all alleged violations of membership obligations since 1991
be waived” and that “unpaid back dues, reinstatement fees, fines, and penal-
ties that could have been levied” against the 4,000 workers who crossed the
picket-line be relinquished (Bologna, 1998, 3).
Given the insidious aspects of this collective bargaining agreement, I
fail to understand how McCall can view this outcome as any type of union
victory. If the standard for considering a union success in a strike is merely
the attainment of a contract after the walkout ends, then any work stoppage
that does not conclude with the actual breaking of the union and in which
a signed collective bargaining agreement is obtained can be deemed a union
triumph!
Conclusion: What Could Have Been Done?
Due to Caterpillar’s strategy to hire permanent replacements in April
1992, five months into the first walkout, one can understand why the UAW
International was hesitant to authorize a second full-fledged strike in June
1994. Indisputably, the union was concerned that Caterpillar would endeavor
to operate during a second work stoppage which, as I discussed earlier, it
was able to do successfully. Because of this, there is an alternative, ignored
by McCall, which may have successfully pressured Caterpillar: a continuance
of the UAW’s 1993–1994 wildcat strikes.
As McCall correctly states, the UAW’s in-plant tactics, utilized against
Caterpillar shortly after the strikers returned to work in April 1992, were
highly effective in pressuring the company (164). And as he points out, these
actions eventually resulted in the conducting of wildcat strikes. Usually oc-
curring between one and three days, these stoppages united workers in their
opposition to management, ignited sympathy strikes and spawned increased
levels of militancy. In fact, these walkouts between September 1993 and June
1994 hampered production and were particularly exasperating to the com-
pany, which did not know when and for how long the walkouts would take
place (Cohen, 2002, 87). During this time period, the UAW wielded the most
pressure on Caterpillar.
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Undoubtedly, the motivation for the second walkout resulted from the
shop floor rank-and-file militancy. Once the union launched an authorized
strike against Caterpillar, however, it squandered the power that it had bran-
dished against the company through implementing rolling wildcat strikes.
Because it no longer had to deal with further in-plant walkouts, Caterpillar
successfully stabilized production through utilizing white collar workers, new
hires and union members who were picket-line crossers (as previously men-
tioned). Due to the company’s plans to continue production during an ex-
tended strike, conceivably a superior strategy would have been to maintain the
wildcat strikes instead of launching a sanctioned strike. Such a strategy would
have necessitated that workers practice high levels of discipline, and pressure
would have continued to be exerted on Caterpillar, something a prolonged
strike failed to achieve, particularly when 30% of union members became
picket-line crossers during the strike’s first two weeks (Devinatz, 2005, 15).
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that this strategy would have been inef-
fective, too. With the wildcat strikes’ continuation, worker demoralization
and impatience at working without an accord may have set in, leading work-
ers to ultimately believe that the only way to force the company into signing
a new agreement would be to conduct a full-blown strike. Moreover, Cater-
pillar potentially intensifying its discipline against wildcat strikers might have
forced them to either scale back or abandon their actions. The company
might have even locked the workers out, which would have placed the UAW
in circumstances similar to those of the 1994–1995 strike.
Unfortunately, we cannot rewind history to see if such a strategy would
have been more successful than the one actually implemented by the UAW.
Nevertheless, it can be asserted with confidence that the UAW’s labor dis-
pute with Caterpillar was in no meaningful sense any type of union “victory.”
More of these kinds of outcomes in the early 21st century would undoubt-
edly lead to irreparable damage to the U. S. labor movement.
Victor G. Devinatz
Department of Management and Quantitative Methods
Illinois State University
Normal, Illinois 61790–5580
vgdevin@ilstu.edu
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NANOTECHNOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPING
CRITIQUE OF SCIENTISM*
While it may seem odd to respond to an article published in these pages
more than six decades ago, John Jacobs’ musings on the “Development of
Atomic Energy” in the summer of 1946 can be usefully revisited as we grapple
with the profound issues raised by today’s major emerging technology —
“nanotechnology,” the umbrella term for a wide array of new means of
manipulating the basic structures and processes of matter and energy on
the “nanoscale” (one billionth of a meter or less) of individual atoms and
molecules, a domain hitherto inaccessible to human engineering.
Jacobs’ argument was straightforward. The development of atomic en-
ergy was “the greatest technical achievement in man’s history,” opening “new
perspectives for human welfare [that] should eventually make possible sub-
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